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Abstract 
 The massive security assemblages surrounding major sporting events 
and political summits embody two layers of spectacle. On the one hand, 
security operations are central to the governance of entertainment and media 
imagery. Simultaneously these security measures are profoundly theatrical and 
calibrated for the maximum visual impact: the spectacle of security itself. Some 
critical thinkers have described this dual spectacle as indicative of a 
contemporary state-corporate obsession with image and perception 
management, an obsession which detracts from ‘valid’ security concerns. By 
contrast I argue that spectacle and theatricality are in fact highly functional 
components of the pacification projects of state and capital. With reference to 
Guy Debord’s conception of ‘spectacle’, this article highlights how mega-events 
reveal, in highly dramatised form, the logic of pacification. Using the 2010 FIFA 
(Fédération Internationale de Football Association) soccer World Cup as a case 
study, the article demonstrates how police and military power are mobilised to 
secure accumulation, to enforce social control and to extend the power and 
arsenal of the state security apparatus. What is truly spectacular about mega-
event security is not just the incorporation of media templates into the working 
of state forces. Rather, the rhetoric and concept of security itself becomes a 
form of spectacular power as it serves to both obscure and justify how mega-
events are ultimately projects of class power.  
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During one of a series of preparatory exercises held ahead of South Africa’s 
hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, members of the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) took part  in what a press release described as an “ action packed” training 
simulation:  
       
Heavily armed criminals tried to flee the scene, but no sooner had the 
thought emerged when they stopped in their tracks thanks to an armed 
response team, with one arrested and another fatally wounded, all in the 
space of ten minutes. Armed criminals were then chased as they fled their 
vehicle, into a building, where a shootout ensued as members of the 
Special Task Force intervened – but the criminals refused to surrender. It 
was time to call in the members of the National Intervention Unit. Fully 
armed and protected they arrived on the scene by helicopter, as well as 
parachutes, to assist the officers on the ground. Live ammunition lit up the 
sky while the SAPS units apprehended the criminals who surrendered after 
one was shot dead on the scene.... cracking down on the terrorists by firing 
live missiles.... After a gun battle ensued, all suspects were shot and 
arrested within 15 minutes after refusing to cooperate (Ndawonde 2009). 
 
    The release goes on to detail how watching members of the press and officials, 
including the Minister of Police, “looked clearly blown away by the end of the morning’s 
drama” (Ndawonde 2009). This example of a policing display aestheticised and calibrated 
to have the maximum amount of media and visual impact is indicative of a general trend 
evident in the extensive, militarised security operations at major sporting events and 
political summits throughout the world: ‘security’ becoming part of the spectacle itself 
(Boyle and Haggerty 2009). In the case of the temporary states of siege which accompany 
major political meetings the agents of participating governments aim at communicating 
“spectacular security (for authorities, police and security agents, corporate elite, political 
leaders) and spectacular insecurity for protestors (and indeed anyone who just happened 
to be passing by)” (Rimke 2011, 196). While adopting many of the same tactics, security 
operations at sporting mega-events are less overtly hostile: as the former commissioner of 
the SAPS put it “[as] security agents we must behave in a way that ensures a peaceful time 
for entertainment and enjoyment that visitors enjoy to the maximum”(FIFA World 
Magazine 2010, 29). This intersection between entertainment and coercive state 
mobilisations results in a situation where ‘‘Mass citizen…. mega-sports and 
entertainment events now automatically produce martial law conditions…. Yet the 
erection of cordons, walls and enclosures, often for whole cities or systems of cities within 
which the spectacles are staged, is as much about managing global branding and TV 
imagery as it is about keeping risks at bay’’ (Graham 2010, 125). Indeed the size and scope 
of these operations appears to dwarf the actual practical requirements of guarding such 
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events, becoming ever more “dystopian and surreal” as novelist China Miéville (2012)  
observed of the plans for the 2012 Summer Olympics which included the mobilisation of 
helicopters carrying snipers, warships in the Thames, jets in the sky, and more British 
troops on duty in London than in the warzone of Afghanistan. 
However this does not mean that we should lament how the politics of “public 
spectacle” (Graham 2010, 382) has superseded apparently less bombastic and somehow 
more ‘practical’ forms of security. Instead as part of the wider anti-security project this 
paper will maintain that rather than being synonymous with public safety, security is at 
heart a mechanism for ensuring an  order based on  “ both sustained capital accumulation 
and a constant political policing” of society (Neocleous 2008, 153). Or rather as Mark 
Neocleous (2011) argues the fundamental goal of security is pacification, the on-going 
deployment of the police and war powers in fabricating and fortifying the rule of capital 
and bourgeois class power, of state domination and social hierarchy. What this implies is 
that ‘pacification’ entails not just repression but also production:  overt violence and 
coercion are one aspect of wider process of securing territories and populations for 
accumulation and creating political docility and acquiescence. This article argues that 
mega-events offer, in a highly dramatised form, a vivid example of the nexus of ‘police-
war-accumulation’ captured within the concept of pacification, as Neocleous argues in 
this volume.  And as Sebastian Saborio shows in his article in this volume, the governance 
of mega-events pivots around wide-ranging societal transformations which go 
substantially beyond deploying state forces and military equipment at tournament venues 
and transport nodes. Event ‘preparations’ are in fact far more extensive, ranging from 
evictions of poor communities and the gentrification of urban areas to extensive 
expansions in the power and arsenal of the host  state. Central to all these interventions is 
the role of image and performance, both in the projection of state security forces as highly 
mobilised and prepared for any eventuality and in wider efforts to ensure that host cities 
and countries are portrayed as clean, safe environments for tourism and business. 
For Boyle and Haggerty (2009) the centrality of image to mega-event security 
evokes Guy Debord’s famous Society of the Spectacle (1967). Debord’s book maintained 
that the texture of modern life is subject to the perpetual dissemination and 
bombardment of images, slogans, false promises and instructions delivered by a 
confluence of bureaucratic governments, the media and advertisers. This serves to 
alienate and distract people from politics, anesthetise them with representation and to 
erode the capacity for individual and collective action (Retort 2004).  However, Boyle and 
Haggerty (2009, 262) tend to focus on the visual and theatrical aspects of mega-event 
governance and the convergence of state and business interests in using mass media to 
display an “appearance of absolute security”.  As with much of the secondary literature on 
Debord, and the Situationist International more generally, this focus on the visual and 
media downplays the radical and Marxist content of his work: his core concepts of 
reification and the commodity are ignored, and so too is the demand for self-
113
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 9 (2) Winter 2013  
 
management and the transformation of everyday life (see Leeper 2012). For Debord 
(1994, 12), spectacle is not “a collection of images but rather a social relationship between 
people that is mediated through image”. Nor is it a distortion of reality or a “decorative 
element added to the world” but instead emerges as a direct product of the capitalist 
mode of production: “news or propaganda, advertising” and entertainment work to serve 
as a “total justification of the conditions and aims of the existing system. It further 
ensures the permanent presence of that justification, for it governs all time spent outside 
the production process itself” (Debord 1994, 12-13). And rather than supplanting the 
violence and repression inherent to the rule of both capital accumulation and the state 
with more diffuse forms of control, spectacle serves to augment it. Writing in the 1960s, 
Debord was as critical of the bureaucracies which had arisen in China and the USSR as he 
was of the governments in the consumer societies emerging in the ‘West’, arguing that 
these had maintained the role of the state as an authoritarian instrument for 
accumulation and the violent enforcement of class domination, whilst ruling their 
proletariats with a spectacle based on pseudo-revolutionary language and image.  
Debord thus asserts that “the dominion of the spectacle… means the dominion 
too of the police” (42) and in a later work suggested that “We should expect, as a logical 
possibility, that the states’ security services intend to use all the advantages they find in 
the realm of the spectacle, which has indeed been organised with that in mind for some 
considerable time” (Debord 1990, 25).  Spectacle also serves as a specialised role as the 
“spokesman for all other activities, a sort of diplomatic representative of hierarchical 
society at its own court, and the source of the only discourse which that society allows 
itself to hear… by means of spectacle, the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in 
an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise. The spectacle is the self-portrait of power” 
(Debord 1994, 18-19). These representations, birthed by social and material relationships, 
appear to behave as independent things outside the control of human beings (Jappe 1999, 
8).  
 This article uses Debord’s original conceptualisation of spectacle to better 
illustrate how ‘security’, and in particular the fetishisation of security evident at major 
events, is an “illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion” (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011, 
15).  In particular, I aim to develop linkages between security and spectacle in a different 
direction from prior research which has tended to focus upon the intersections between 
state power, war and the media and entertainment industries (Retort 2004; Stahl 2009). 
Although I will discuss the importance of aesthetics, image and theatricality to the 
policing regime initiated throughout South African cities for the 2010 World Cup, my 
main goal is to explore how the very concept of security functions as the alienated 
spectacle described by Debord. That is to say that ‘security’ and the grip its holds over 
urban  space and policy making appears to function as an autonomous force, which both 
obscures its basis in social relations of exploitation and class domination while 
simultaneously  serving to extend and justify these relations under the guise of public 
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protection.  Indeed, as I will argue, the policing operations at mega-events are no longer 
about the events as such but, rather, have become security spectacles in their own right.  
These security spectacles allow states to experiment with new forms of power and ensure 
vast profits for franchise and brand owners. And as this article aims to demonstrate, these 
spectacles can be considered as an increasingly prominent front in the “long durée of 
pacification under capitalist relations” (Rigakos 2011, 80) and the continual efforts to 
extract resources, to control populations and to entrench the domination of the state. 
 
Saturation Policing and Spectacular Power 
 
The ‘spectacular’ nature of World Cup security was most overtly demonstrated by 
the preparations of the South African government. The SAPS allocated over 41,000 
officers to the tournament and embarked upon a major procurement drive of operational 
equipment including new helicopters, CCTV and riot equipment. Dedicated police 
escorts were provided to teams, referees and members of the FIFA delegation, while 
“saturation policing” (ESPN 2009) tactics were used at land, sea and air borders, across 
transport routes and around hotels, tournament events and tourist attractions. Stadiums 
were surrounded by mechanised units such as police pursuit vehicles and motorbikes, 
Casspir armoured personal carriers, Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, mobile command 
centres and emergency ambulances. During the planning stages stadium preparations 
were even more extensive, including proposed ‘community processing centres’ for ‘non-
compliant match spectators’ (SAFA 2003: 9.4).  The police also implemented spatial 
cordons in the ten kilometres around stadiums with a “focus on preventing domestic 
extremism, including strike actions and service delivery protests” (World Cup South 
Africa Online 2010). The tournament saw the largest ever domestic deployment of the 
South African National Defence Force, exceeding in size even its missions during the 
various states of emergency declared by the Apartheid government in the 1980s. The 
justification offered was that this was part of a “security rather than a defence operation” 
intended to prevent “people with a cause” from disrupting the event (Szabo 2009). From 
the outset, security operations in the nine host cities were organised to ensure a massive 
visual impact. This was given particular consideration in the South African context 
because of the country’s dangerous international reputation due to high incidences of 
violent crime. According to one government planning document, the image of South 
Africa enabled by security measures was as important as the actual pre-emption of 
violence: ‘‘operational planning shall concentrate on the security operations at all airports 
to ensure that the all-important first impression that is created is one of a safe, secure and 
stable country and region’’(OA /NATJOINTS 2008, 30). This aesthetic fetish went beyond 
just perceptions of personal safety: “security is not just about crime”, claimed one Cape 
Town official, “it is also about ensuring that our streets are clean. Service delivery is also a 
part of our security planning” (Richard Bosman, interview with author, 20 July 2010).  
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The press releases and media statements which accompanied the unveiling of 
security systems were infused with depictions of seamless functioning and total control. 
According to Lieutenant General Andre Pruis (2010, 13) technology created a feeling of 
‘‘police omnipresence’’ and allowed the police to ‘‘make South Africa a very small 
country’’. The King Shaka International airport outside Durban, the construction of 
which was fast-tracked for the World Cup, opened with the “best, latest security 
technology” including X-ray machines “capable of detecting everything from drugs to 
bombs” (News24 2010). A particular focus was placed on automated technology, which 
included the purchase of remote-operated bomb disposal equipment that “had proved 
itself in Iraq” and “shows no fear”, which the SAPS unveiled and demonstrated at a 
shopping mall (Smillie 2008). Such attempts to convey the image of absolute security and 
control were moderated by efforts to ensure that an atmosphere of consumer festival 
prevailed. For example, the spokesperson for one of the private security companies which 
provided support functions to the police suggested that “if one of our guys sees a chip 
packet lying on the ground that could potentially house an explosive device, he has to be 
diplomatic and gently move the danger out of the way without the fans even knowing it” 
(The Event 2010).  
At the domestic level, the government claimed that such dramatic and expensive 
security measures were necessary not only for the country’s international image but were 
intended to leave behind a ‘security legacy’ of increased police numbers and surveillance 
equipment.  Such an argument was reiterated by big business, the media, security 
intellectuals and opposition political parties. Expressing what seemed to be a common 
elite sentiment, one opposition Member of Parliament approvingly described the 
tournament as: 
   
The biggest spectacle and biggest opportunity to achieve a common 
national identity.  As South Africans, we are destined to achieve great 
things and that togetherness must be forged in the burning excitement 
which is the World Cup. Never mind the costs that we will have to carry, 
we as South Africans can use sport to achieve what other nations have 
done through war (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010). 
 
However, much evidence suggests that the scale and size of the security operations 
dwarfed the actual tactical requirements of providing public safety around tournament 
venues and events.  Police officials candidly acknowledged that the spatial distribution of 
South African cities favoured their tournament efforts due to the concentration of violent 
crime in poor, black townships and informal settlements rather than in the gentrified 
urban spaces where most events took place (The Star 2007).  Furthermore, the annual 
report of the SAPS noted that high levels of police visibility during the tournament had 
116
 McMICHAEL: Spectacle, Pacification and the 2010 World Cup, South Africa 
 
little “noticeable effect on violent contact crime” (South African Police Service 2011, 9) 
throughout the rest of the country. 
While this suggests that the theatre of state sabre-rattling during the World Cup 
was primarily motivated by a desire to manage international perception, the displays of 
government power also serviced domestic political goals. Most notably the SAPS used the 
tournament to project an image of efficiency and power in contrast with their public 
reputation for brutality and incompetence. The high-visibility of the tournament also 
worked to benefit the military which used it as an opportunity to leverage substantial 
funding increases from national government. 
Outside of the internal politics of the security forces, mega-events such as the 
World Cup may serve a wider role in fortifying host states, through functioning as an 
“instrument of pacification by… mystifying citizens through a grandiose spectacle” ( 
Broudehoux 2007,99). In the case of South Africa, the state called for citizens to use the 
World Cup as a platform for “social cohesion” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2008), 
to put aside antagonisms for the duration of the event and to forgo the often explosive 
community protests and labour strikes which reveal the simmering tensions within post-
Apartheid society. Prior to the tournament President Zuma made official ‘fact finding 
missions’ to several of the most “most militant and dissatisfied areas” (Nhlapo 2010) in 
the country which was described by one activist as an attempt to:  
         
Make sure that, come the World Cup tournament, marginalised people 
don’t protest and embarrass South Africa in front of an international 
media spotlight. What he is doing is like locking your children in a room 
so that they don’t cry that they are hungry in front of a guest. He actually 
just wants service delivery protests not to erupt when the rest of the world 
is in our country.   
 
These measures were accompanied by less subtle forms of control as security officials 
promised to show ‘zero tolerance’ to ‘illegal’ protests and put pressure on urban 
authorities to withhold permits for marches and gatherings (McMichael 2012). Indeed, 
while the government presented the security measures as a response to the dangers posed 
by armed, organised criminal gangs and terrorists, the rhetoric and preparatory tactics 
used by the state reflected a pronounced fear of the potential threat offered by society as a 
whole. Intelligence reports discussed the necessity of maintaining surveillance on labour 
issues and the need to ensure “mechanisms to control possible strikes and protest 
actions” (Republic of South Africa 2011:31).  Much of the police procurement drive was 
focused upon buying riot gear and after the tournament this equipment formed the basis 
for a revised, “aggressive” public order policy (Lukani, 2011). And indeed in the years 
since the tournament the most visible security legacy has been the deployment of 
purchases such as body armour and water cannons at political and labour demonstrations 
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which have been increasingly characterised by lethal police violence against protesters: 
notably some of these purchases were on display at the site of the 2012 Marikana 
massacre where SAPS special forces killed 34 striking miners. The extent to which protest 
was criminalised during the tournament also suggests that intimidation against the state’s 
population is intrinsic to the theatre of state power during major events. Alongside 
reassuring tourists and demonstrating their ‘crime fighting’ capabilities, the spectacle also 
revealed to the citizen-subjects what would be done to them should they confront the 
established order. Mega-events thus provide another instance of how class violence and 
state repression are an implicit premise within the concept of security. 
 
Protecting FIFA’s Brand  
 
 The security mobilisation did not exclusively revolve around protecting the image 
of the South African state. Policing operations were as much about protecting FIFA’s 
revenue stream and securing the advertising investments made by its corporate ‘partners’ 
and ‘sponsors’, including such  major brands  as Sony, Coca-Cola, McDonalds and 
Adidas. Under the comprehensive government guarantees which were signed as a 
condition of bidding for, let alone winning, hosting rights, the South African state was 
obliged to manage and cross subsidise all ‘necessary’ arrangements for FIFA’s World Cup. 
These expenses ranged from stadium construction to granting legal and taxation 
exemptions for FIFA’s operations during the tournament. Such a contractual framework 
ensured that security measures were continuously informed and structured by the 
commercial and branding imperatives of FIFA and its corporate allies, indicative of how  
the deployment of police power works  to exact the paired ends of securing profit for 
capital and ensuring state control over urban space and populations.  
Police and military operations focused on maintaining an image of South African 
cities in general and tournament events in particular, which was considered amenable to 
the ‘brand identity’ of the World Cup.  Early FIFA reports on South Africa’s suitability 
indicate that the association was impressed by the states capacity to enforce the desired 
image of festival despite some concerns. 
 
 General information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security, but the 
Inspection Group was not aware of any such claims during the visit, although it was 
possible to read press reports on some violence in marginal areas during our visit…. We 
therefore came to the conclusion that as long as people attending the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup (FIFA family and spectators) keep within certain boundaries; they should not 
encounter any trouble. With regard to organising security for a possible 2010 FIFA World 
Cup in the country, the Inspection Group received an excellent, comprehensive work 
schedule from one of the high commanders of the national police, covering stadiums, 
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media centres and main hotels, that will doubtless satisfy every requirement for the event. 
After the presentation we concluded that they have enough experience with this kind of 
event to handle them without difficulty. We must say that the security business is a 
flourishing industry in the country (FIFA 2004). 
 
 At the level of practical deployment the spatial protection of FIFA’s brand was 
indicated by the government’s tactic of saturation policing around stadiums, fan parks 
and association related locations such as FIFA’s temporary headquarters in 
Johannesburg. Aside from providing direct close protection to elites, such as FIFA and 
corporate delegates, and dramatically assuring foreign tourists and the international 
media of the safety of South African host cities, this also ensured that corporate logos and 
brands would not be associated with images of crime or unrest through the state working 
to manage “particularly attractive parts of ... host cities in the interest of visibility and 
branding for…. commercial partners” (Klauser 2011, 9). In the enforcement of the image 
desired by FIFA, the security forces adopted a dual approach which combined 
concessions and coercion. On one hand, the police took a lenient stance towards certain 
behaviour of tourists and fans, such as public drunkenness. But on the other, people who 
breached FIFA restrictions, for such infringements as unlicensed ticket sales, faced rapid 
arrest and sentencing through the 56 ‘special courts’ which were established to try crimes 
related to the tournament.  These courts tried both South Africans and foreign nationals 
and reserved particularly harsh sentences for both citizens caught robbing tourists and for 
commercial violations, with one man received a three year sentence for the possession of 
thirty match tickets. 
The severity with which commercial infringements were handled indicates the 
wider influence which the interests of FIFA and World Cup advertisers exerted upon 
security measures. In particular state authorities were enrolled in the business of guarding 
and prosecuting attempts at ‘ambush marketing’ by unlicensed operators attempting to 
capitalise on the opportunity for visual and media exposure afforded by the tournament. 
FIFA’s list of prohibited activities and signage included:  
      
branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible 
to the street), branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – 
as in visible to the street), aerial advertising (blimps, balloons, or other 
airships), unauthorised street trading or vendors, any political and 
religious demonstrations (Cape Town Partnership 2009).   
 
As a result, restriction zones and blockades were established around stadiums in which 
joint units of police and FIFA personnel patrolled for signs of commercial infractions. In 
turn, the efforts to ensure the visual domination of accredited brands during the World 
Cup was presented to the South African public as a safety issue comparable to violent 
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crime or attacks by political extremists. Replicating the ‘zero tolerance’ rhetoric used by 
government officials, FIFA representatives claimed that infringements would “be shown 
no mercy” (Barnes 2010) and “We need to be strong. We need to protect our brand” 
(Business Day 2010). Urban municipalities distributed promotional material designed to 
warn the public about the dangers of ambush marketing which included  urging  
individuals to self-police their own behaviour and aspirations “Most often, if you think 
that something you are planning may be considered ambush marketing, it probably is” ( 
Cape Town Partnership 2009). Such an approach (‘the enemy within’) mirrors the police 
logic most recently displayed in the war on terror, in which “because the suspect 
communities are always already among us, we are all under suspicion, all potentially 
guilty”- albeit with suspicion being intensified by racial and gender factors with the black 
poor being far more likely to be targeted for state ‘intervention’ in the case of South Africa 
(Neocleous 2011, 49).  Noticeably the same security rhetoric used by the state in the name 
of fighting crime or terrorism, the talk of ‘no mercy’ and control over urban space, was 
similarly assimilated and deployed within FIFA’s projects of assuring dominance over 
visual signage.  
Under FIFA’s commercial restrictions ‘political and religious demonstrations’ 
around stadiums were listed as forms of ambush marketing.  In turn, municipal 
authorities presented this requirement as a security measure necessary to the “smooth 
functioning and running of FIFA World Cup matches” (City of Cape Town 2010a). Using 
this rationale SAPS issued an unofficial directive to cities to not allow marches and 
demonstrations for the duration of the event due to not having “the capacity to police 
marches and the World Cup simultaneously” (Duncan 2010).  Such cases illustrate how 
security restrictions served a combined purpose for the state and FIFA.  Bans on visible 
demonstrations both maintained the pristine ‘apolitical’ image of the World Cup brand, 
while cohering with the government’s attempts to discipline civil society through 
enforcing a moratorium on political protest.  
Indeed, it is striking how at virtually every juncture security plans offered tactics 
and procedures which maintained an interchangeable applicability for both policing and 
commercial purposes. For example, under by-laws passed within host cities, FIFA was 
allowed to declare all the routes to and from airports, training venues and designated 
hotels as “commercial exclusion zones” (The Mercury 2009)  which aligned with the 
security forces strategy of enforcing cordons around these sites. Such combined 
restrictions were thoroughly worked into the details of planning from an early stage. For 
instance, the creation of remote search parks and airspace restrictions around and above 
stadiums were not only intended to prevent possible terror attacks but to also to restrict 
unlicensed commercial material and aerial advertising from entering the exclusion zone 
(McMichael 2012, 524,526). Of course, this geography of security was also marked by 
class segregation and de facto racial apartheid, with ‘backstage’ security operations in 
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working class and poor black neighbourhoods and ‘clean’ policing displays targeted at the 
middle and upper classes and affluent international tourists.  
Moreover, while the “absolute security” (Boyle and Haggerty 2009, 262) ethos 
espoused by tournament organisers penalised unaffiliated companies attempting to 
capitalise on the presence of the World Cup it nonetheless created markets for businesses 
attempting to sell another commodity: security itself. Companies both offered their 
services as ‘support’ to the state-managed security regime and attempted to benefit from 
fears about the governments perceived inability to protect tourists.  Manufactures 
incorporated the ‘legacy’ rhetoric of the state with the helicopter company Robinson 
(2008, 4) claiming of its equipment that “While the R44 Raven II Police Helicopters will 
play integral roles in the security effort for the World Cup, they are also part of a 
sustained effort to create a safer environment that will continue to benefit the citizens of 
South Africa long after the World Cup concludes”.  On the other hand, the local 
subsidiary of Mercedes Benz used the tournament as an opportunity to promote its latest 
ranges of luxury armour-plated vehicles: 
 
[the] Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard and Mercedes-Benz E-Guard, which 
provide occupants with protection from attacks by firearms and 
explosives. The Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard has armour to resist military 
standard small-arms projectiles that have almost twice the velocity of 
bullets fired by a revolver, and provides protection against fragments from 
hand grenades (IOL 2009). 
      
Notably, this ‘security’ is a luxury commodified for the bourgeois, both for the South 
African and foreign tourist elite, and aimed against the implicit threat posed by the 
racialized ‘dangerous classes’.  The saleability of event security as a commodity has 
continued long after the World Cup. In April 2013 the South African based defence 
manufacture Paramount Group announced the sale of a number of its armour plated and 
“hand grenade attack protected… Maverick internal security vehicles” (Radebe 2013) to 
the state government of Rio de Janeiro. According to a press release by the company, the 
vehicles (which are intended to be used by special forces such as BOPE (Batalhão de 
Operações Policiais Especiais-Saborio, 2013) “play a critical role in the security 
infrastructure for both” the World Cup and Olympics” (Paramount Group 2013). The 
integration of South African manufactured hardware into the arsenals of police shock 
units being used to reorder favelas in Rio ahead of mega-events in Brazil is exemplary of 
the transnational union of pacification projects, with advanced technologies of attack and 
control developed in one environment being readily transferable into another, as Tyler 
Wall argues in his contribution to this volume (Wall 2013).  
More generally, capital and state both cohered around a certain image of secure 
South African urban spaces. Beyond the shared desire to flood the streets with security 
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forces and to offer a bombastic rhetoric of ‘no mercy’, the South African government and 
FIFA – that is, state and corporation – shared an ideal of nothing less than the pacified 
city. The dream of the “fantasy city” (Samara 2010) is a dream of order, and as the other 
articles in this special issue argue, such order can be realised only through the classic 
pacification technique: removal of ‘undesirable’ and ‘disorderly’ elements. These 
messages of ‘no mercy’ and the ‘fantasy city’ while two sides of the same project, are 
aimed at quite different populations. Hence, the poor, mainly black population is targeted 
with the message ‘no mercy’ the condition for bourgeois whites and black to ensure their 
‘fantasy city’.  
Throughout the country municipalities used police and private security guards to 
remove vagrants and potential petty criminals. In the city of Durban street children were 
cleared from visible areas such as the CBD and beachfront, which was described by a 
municipal official as a standard procedure “We often remove them from the streets when 
there are big events like the World Cup and major conferences, because some of them 
mug tourists and damage the image of the country” (The Mercury 2011). These 
expulsions were often presented as public health measures with the City of Cape Town 
describing removals as an attempt to protect indigents from the harsh winter climates in 
the centre of the city (City of Cape Town 2010b).  Such actions were further encouraged 
by the FIFA by-laws which each host city implemented for the duration of the 
tournament which used the language of ‘beautification’ and ‘access control’, to minimise 
the presence of poverty. Most overtly, this included provisions against begging in “public 
open spaces controlled or managed by municipalities” (eThekweni Municipality n.d, 32) 
and placed incredibly stringent restrictions on street trading (43). In a more subtle 
manner, it also employed a wide-ranging definition of prohibited ‘nuisances’ near access 
controlled and special event sites. These included any “public building which is so 
situated, constructed, used or kept so as to be unsafe or to be injurious or dangerous to 
health”, “any occupied dwelling for which no proper and sufficient supply of pure water 
is available under a reasonable distance” and ‘‘any area of land kept or permitted to 
remain in such a state as to be offensive’’ (eThekweni Municipality n.d, 13). Although this 
was presented as a matter of  ‘health security’ it also implied that squatter camps and 
illegally occupied buildings, which often lack on-site amenities, could be defined as 
nuisances, as has often been the case with other urban redevelopments.  
The proximity of the World Cup also provided an impetus to state-led efforts to 
eradicate, rather than to upgrade, informal squatter settlements for the benefit of “tourists 
and investors…. The provincial legislature of KwaZulu Natal drafted a ‘Slum Elimination 
and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Bill’ which included “repressive direct 
measures used during the apartheid era” (Huchezemeyer 2011: 13, 17). After a national 
court action by the shack dwellers movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, the proposed act 
was eventually ruled unconstitutional. Nonetheless the evidence suggests that a pattern of 
attempting to aggressively evict shack dwellers was merely encouraged, rather than 
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imposed, by the presence of FIFA and the World Cup. The process of the state securing 
valuable areas of cities for business and leisure is indicative of a post-Apartheid 
development strategy that is actively resegregating cities on the basis of class. What the 
World Cup offered was a heightened version of the on-going efforts to regulate and 
discipline people, spaces and consumer behaviour under the guise of creating ‘world class 
cities’ for investment and tourism. Furthermore these efforts to maintain an 
uninterrupted campaign against the urban poor, whether in the name of safety or health, 
offer an excellent example of the long historical logic of pacification and the use of police 
power. This is perhaps even more glaring in the South Africa context, given the specific 
history of official Apartheid and segregation, but the World Cup is emblematic of how a 
more generalised logic of security enforces a neo-apartheid that is simultaneously based 
on class and race.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 As with major sporting, entertainment and political gatherings throughout the 
world, the 2010 World Cup saw the  enforcement of a desired  aesthetic regime and social 
order through the deployment of a vast, multi-city “police network” (Rigakos 2011, 79)  
which included  the substantial involvement of the military and private security 
companies.  In the sense identified by much of the critical research on these mega-events, 
the operations of this network were designed to be spectacular. From the outset the tactics 
of the government’s security forces were planned to capture exposure and attention, 
organised like the unveiling of a new commercial brand or product. Simultaneously, these 
measures were enrolled in the protection of the brand image of FIFA and the assemblage 
of corporate institutions affiliated with the tournament. However, as this article has 
argued, the spectacular component of these policing assemblages goes beyond the focus 
on the demonstrative and the decorative. Instead it has focused on the spectacular 
content of the concept of ‘security’, with its infinite capacity to incorporate elite political 
and economic goals into vaguely defined rhetoric about protecting the public from 
harms. And while I have not emphasized this is my contribution, in addition to being 
about class and race, ‘security’ is clearly also an affair saturated with gender. The 
masculine sporting spectacle of the FIFA World Cup is echoed by the overwhelmingly 
male displays of police and military force to guarantee ‘order’.  
It might therefore be said that security functions as the ‘spokesperson’ of power-
gendered, racialized, rooted in class inequalities- and the “permanent justification of the 
conditions and aims of the existing system” (Debord, 1994, 12). Through the continual 
appeal to ‘security’ huge expenditures and resources are poured into operations clearly 
designed to protect the interests of elites and designated consumers, whilst increasing the 
repressive capacity of states through appeal to ‘legacies’. But rather than being the result 
123
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 9 (2) Winter 2013  
 
of emergency or exceptional conditions such events bring to the fore a heightened version 
of normal politics, in which security is used to mould urban space and society according 
to the dictates of state and capital.  
In that sense, at the heart of the security of the mega-event is the logic of 
pacification. More tellingly, at the heart of the spectacle of security we find nothing less 
than the spectacle of pacification.   
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